Employing data from three surveys of mass opinion conducted in Lithuania, Ukraine and European Russia during 1990, 1991 and 1992, we examine three prominent but competing hypotheses about the source of political values in the post-Soviet societies: historically derived political culture, regime indoctrination and the effects of societal modernization. The literature on Soviet political culture argues that Russian mass values are distinguished by authoritarianism and love of order, values which will be largely shared by Ukrainians, especially East Ukrainians, whereas Lithuanian society would not evince this pattern. Our data do not support this hypothesis. We then examine acceptance of Soviet era norms, both political and economic. We do not find support for the argument that regime indoctrination during the Soviet period produced a set of ideologically derived values throughout the former Soviet Union and across a series of generations. The third hypothesis -that industrialization, urbanization, war and changing educational opportunities shaped the formative experiences of succeeding generations in the Soviet societies and, therefore, their citizens' values -receives the most support: in each of the three societies, differences in political values across age groups, places of residence and levels of education are noteworthy. The variations in political values we find across demographic groupings help us to understand the level of pro-democratic values in each society. We find that in Russia and Ukraine more support for democracy can be found among urban, better educated respondents than among other groups. In Lithuania, the urban and better educated respondents evince pro-democratic values at about the same level as their counterparts in Russia and Ukraine, but Lithuanian farmers and blue-collar workers support democracy at a level closer to urban, white-collar Lithuanians than to their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. In all three societies, those citizens most likely to hold values supportive of democracy are those who are less favourable to Soviet-era values and less convinced of the primacy of the need for social and political 'order'. Those who desire strong leadership, however, tend to have more democratic values, not more authoritarian ones.
Why do some societies have a pattern of mass political values that seems supportive of stable democracy while others do not?! The political transformations under way in the post-Soviet societies provide a rare laboratory for I A variety of terms has been used by different researchers to indicate subjective, politically relevant, individual outlooks: values, attitudes, orientations, beliefs and others. Though definitions vary, the term "values' is most commonly employed to indicate the more fundamental outlooks that we seek to study and we thus employ that term. See William M. Reisinger, 'Conclusions: Mass investigating this question. Because the societies within the Soviet Union were so diverse, some analysts argue that the distributions of pro-democratic values will vary according to their political and social traditions. History has blended a distinct brew of political outlooks for every society. In other words, we should expect to find a Russian political culture, a Kazakh political culture, a Georgian political culture, etc. Yet other observers argue that we should expect that the traumatic societal transformations of the Soviet period, experienced by all Soviet societies (though not for the same number of years by all), had a similar impact on political values in each. Those who see a common impact disagree about the nature of the impact. One group argues that the regime's conscious efforts to inculcate Marxist-Leninist political values (,indoctrination') shaped virtually all those now alive in these societies. The other points instead to the intensive process of industrialization, urbanization and education that the Soviet regime carried out. Because those processes ('modernization') have elsewhere shaped political values, they should be expected to influence values within the Soviet societies in a similar manner.
Each of these three understandings of the source of political values in the societies that formerly comprised the Soviet Union -political culture, indoctrination and modernization -implies a prediction of the likelihood of democratic consolidation in the Soviet successor states. The first two both tend to be pessimistic about democracy's chances. Few of the Soviet societies experienced the Western intellectual and political trends that characterize the longest lasting democracies. The largest society, Russia, in particular was seen as having a heritage of authoritarianism that would ill prepare them for either opposing an autocratic regime or shoring up a fledgling democracy. The Soviet regime's ideological indoctrination, by downplaying individual rights, pluralism and other liberal institutions, is generally seen as preventing the development of pro-democratic values. Only those who conclude that modernization has undercut the other influences expect to find values supportive of democracy within many sectors of these societies.
In this article, we test the major propositions concerning Soviet political values -propositions about the sources of those values as well as about the implications for democratization. We employ data from surveys of mass opinion conducted in Lithuania, Ukraine and European Russia during 1990, 1991 and 1992. These data are more extensive and representative than previously available. They provide the clearest picture to date of mass political orientations in the former Soviet Union -both before and after the break-up of that state. We find weak support for 'political culture' arguments -arguments that distinctive features of a society's history give its citizens a unique pattern of political values. Moreover, the Soviet regime had extremely limited success in its seventy-year effort to inculcate regime values among Soviet citizens. The data do support arguments that the societal transformations carried out during the Soviet period have shaped current values. Demographic differences in the Russian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian populaces, especially age and level of education, do help explain differences in values. Even so, demographic information alone does not adequately explain variation in the distribution of key democratic values, a finding that reminds us that the post-Soviet societies are complex and finely differentiated societies. Likewise, simple expectations about the prospects for democracy in one society versus another receive little support from our data. Democratic values are present in all three societies -in the predominantly Slavic societies of Russia and Ukraine as well as in the more Westernized Lithuania -at levels the pessimists would not have expected. Our data thus help account for the role that mass political action played in the fall of the Soviet regime. Even so, democratic values are concentrated in certain societal groups and are not so high that the consolidation of democracy is assured.
PAST RESEARCH INTO SOVIET POLITICAL VALUES
Efforts to depict the political values of Soviet citizens have a long history. They were endemic in the study of Soviet politics -despite that field's predominant focus on elites and despite the prevalence at one time of the totalitarian model, which posited extremely limited possibilities for non-politicians to influence politics significantly. Scholars employed the Soviet people's value structure to explain participation patterns, economic behaviour, as well as their basic acceptance of (or at least acquiescence to) the regime. 2 Attention to mass values naturally increased in response to the changes initiated during the Gorbachev period. For many, mass political values held at least one key to the prospects for radical political change, in particular, for democratization.
The preferred technique for measuring mass political values and other orientations is to conduct surveys of a sample of a society's populace. 3 Generally, the Soviet regime did not permit such surveys prior to glasnost', and the results of those that were conducted were unavailable to Western scholars during most of the Soviet period. Surveys of those who had emigrated from the Soviet Union provided many helpful insights into Soviet mass values, but the drawbacks of the sample made firm conclusions difficult. 4 Given the lack of direct survey data on Soviet values, the field of Soviet studies also examined Russia's past institutions, social patterns and literature (and those of other Soviet societies) for insights into mass values. However, such forms of evidence have their own flaws. Literary works, for example, represent trends and debates among the intelligentsia, and literary depictions of popular values will reflect the prism of the author's own concerns. Survey data seem the best route to measuring the distributions of different values, that is, to answering such questions as how widespread within a given society is a given value, and which people hold which values. The findings we report take advantage of the lifting of restrictions on collaborative survey research that occurred at the end of the 1980s. We use systematic survey results to examine prominent questions about Soviet (and now post-Soviet) values. Two distinct but related questions concern us here: where do political values in these societies come from? And does that make a difference for democratization?
CONTENDING SOURCES OF POLITICAL VALUES
The pattern of political values within a society has a complex combination of sources. Potential sources can be found on three levels of analysis: (I) factors that characterize the society as a whole (and thus distinguish it from other societies); (2) characteristics of within-society groups; and (3) idiosyncratic sources of values which distinguish an individual from others in the society and in groups to which the individual belongs. Most of the arguments about Soviet political values have revolved around the first level of analysis: factors thought to generate particular political values across the entire society. Because of their simplicity, across-the-board hypotheses have an appealing power and (F'note continued) culture theorists to agree on a definition ofthe term, to relate individual orientations to society-wide 'cultures', and to provide clear hypotheses about how individual orientations will influence either individual behaviour or society-wide political outcomes. On the other hand, the distribution of certain key values does merit investigation. Fortunately, we can investigate values without the encumbrance of dealing with political culture in its entirety. Despite eschewing the label 'political culture' to depict the object of our interest, we use our findings to discuss the prospects for democracy, as have those studying political culture. (Compare this list of the challenges facing those who employ political culture as a concept to the discussion in Ruth Lane, 'Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory? ' Comparative Political Studies, 25 (1992) , 362-87.) 4 See Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen; White, 'The USSR'; Wayne Di Franceisco and Zvi Gitelman, 'Soviet Political Culture and "Covert Participation" in Policy Implementation', American Political Science Review, 78 (1984) , 603-21; and the contributions to Millar, ed., Politics, Work and Daily Life. In each of these cases, the authors discuss possible sources of bias from interviewing emigres and are careful to choose their analyses so as to minimize the bias.
elegance. This power and elegance might prove a liability, however, if the hypothesis hides important within-society variation. Given the size and complexity of the post-Soviet societies, therefore, the appropriateness of different levels of analysis ought to be subject to testing. We thus begin by examining the influence of the two factors most commonly thought to shape popular political values within the Soviet Union: long-term historical patterns and efforts by the Soviet regime to inculcate popular values in line with MarxismLeninism. For each, we derive hypotheses testable with our survey data. We then examine hypotheses at the second level of analysis: the degree to which key demographic categories -including political generation, urban residence and level of education -explain the distribution of values within each of the three societies surveyed.
History and Contemporary Values
The way in which we employ the term 'history' needs clarifying. For three decades, the notion that each society has its own political culture has dominated the comparative study of mass values. A society'S political culture consists of the orientations towards politics of the citizens en masse. Cross-nationally, political cultures must differ because each society has been through different experiences. This approach, furthermore, implies that past distributions of values shape future distributions; a country's political culture has continuity. Distant events or patterns of behaviour can carry weight in the formation of values long beyond the time when they occurred. Though the political culture approach need not wed itself to the notion of continuity, its proponents were slow to incorporate notions of value change. 5 So, when we discuss the impact of history, we refer to arguments that certain unique characteristics of the Russian past (or other societies' pasts) have a direct impact on the shape of current political values. Some societies may have historical heritages that better prepare them for making democracy work. Also, we do not refer to arguments that posit an intermediary variable (such as societal demographics) between history and values. Those arguing that the urbanization of the Russian population during the Soviet period changed the political culture are arguing against those who stress the weight of history. This is an important debate, and its arguments must be tested against the distribution of public values.
Observers have postulated numerous 'traditional' roots of contemporary Russian political values. These include the climate and topography, the Orthodox religion, the peasant political economy, the political institutions of the Russian autocracy, and the lack of what we now term a civil society -autonomous sub-groups actively pursuing their interests vis-a-vis the state. As a result of some or all of these features of Russia and Russian history, observers attribute an array of values to Russians. Some argue, for instance, that the communal organization of peasant life influences current political orientations. 6 Russians, in this view, tend to stress one's duties to the commune (the village or, later, the country) and the rewards the commune can bestow, rather than political or civil rights owed to an individual. Another result of the communal tradition that, many feel, continues to influence the Russian outlook is a distaste for individual achievement or distinction. If one can help the entire group prosper, fine, but better that all suffer equally than that one gets ahead. 7 Other attributes of the contemporary Russian outlook attributed to Russian history include messianic expansionism, low levels of political efficacy, fatalism, dogmatism and intolerance. 8 Most commonly stressed, however, in the context of the prospects for democratization, is the 'authoritarian' strain in Russian tradition. This authoritarian outlook consists of a respect for strong leadership and a fear of disorder or anarchy. The respect for strong leadership is said to derive from several factors: the period of rule by Mongol khans (AD 1240-1480); the vastness of Russian territory, which mandated strong leadership to ensure protection from outside attack; and the strong powers accorded the male head of household in early peasant life. In the latter sense, the authoritarian trait is related to patrimonialism. Russians are said to have felt a personalistic relationship with the sovereign, the Tsar, to whom they were subject and whom they could petition when things got really bad. Surveys of Soviet emigres indicated that support for strong leadership in the political system was widespread, and more recent in-country surveys lend support as well. One must be extremely cautious in drawing implications about the 'authoritarian' nature of a heritage of valuing strong leadership. Someone finding that Russians desire a strogii nachal'nik (a decisive or firm leader, one with a strong hand on the rudder) should not hastily interpret this as approval for absolutist rule. Having a strong and accountable leader is precisely the reason why most democracies have a single executive officer whose power and whose responsibility for the success or failure of government policy distinguish him or her from the legislature, even when that person depends on a parliamentary majority for continuing in office. Weak leadership is a bad idea in any political system. The key questions in assessing acceptance of democracy are whether the citizens desire limits on the leader, in both time and scope, and who they believe ought to invoke those limits. In fact, to foreshadow later analyses in this article, we find that desire for strong leadership is positively correlated with democratic values, even when holding other factors constant. Lithuania and Poland became a single state. For several centuries, this state practised a form of partially democratic rule not found elsewhere in Eastern Europe. As part of the Polish-Lithuanian unification, the bulk of Ukrainian territory was transferred from loose Lithuanian suzerainty to direct Polish rule. The Ukrainians disliked the rule by the Catholic Poles who, though Slavic, did not share the Ukrainians' Orthodox religion. Polish efforts to strengthen Catholicism in the region were a source of antagonism and put Moscow on alert. The Polish overlords had to put down numerous rebellions by Ukrainian peasants as well as by the Cossacks. In the middle 1600s, Ukrainian rebels turned to Moscow for aid. The resulting war ended in 1667 with Ukraine split between Polish and Muscovite control. That division split Ukraine into eastern and western portions and into more Russian-oriented versus less Russianoriented Ukrainians, respectively. In three phases from the 1770s through the 1790s, Austria, Prussia and Russia divided and incorporated Poland, which had become the dominant partner in the Polish-Lithuanian union. In the process, Russia received the rest of Ukrainian territory and much of what is now Belorussia. Russia and Ukraine became republics within the Soviet Union. Lithuania re-emerged as an independent state following the First World War, but the Soviet Union forcibly annexed Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours, Latvia and Estonia, in 1940, making them republics within the Soviet Union.
Although we cannot, of course, compare current political values with values from centuries past, cross-national comparisons can highlight historical influences. The hypothesized Russian bent towards authoritarianism is not part of the Lithuanian heritage. Although Ukraine had only the briefest periods of independent statehood until 1991, Ukrainians gained a political and cultural identity while under Polish-Lithuanian and Russian rule. The western portions of Ukraine in particular share more of the Lithuanian-Polish heritage. In recent decades, many Ukrainian and Lithuanian intellectuals -together with intellectuals from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary -sought to highlight their societies' distinctiveness from (Asiatic) Russia by referring to their region as 'Central Europe' . 12 We hypothesize, in other words, that if history is a particularly important source of current values, scores on our measures of pro-authoritarian values should be highest among citizens of Russia and somewhat lower among citizens of eastern Ukraine, western Ukraine and Lithuania, in that order. 13 13 A slightly different argument would be that the ethnicity of the respondent is more important for degree of authoritarian values than the residence of the respondent. If so, a better test would be to group Russians and other Slavs together and compare them to other nationalities, regardless of republic. A t-test of the hypothesis that the mean value on the index of order discussed below is equal between Slavs and non-Slavs results in statistics of 0.33 in Russia and 1.14 in Ukraine (both statistically insignificant) but of 4.13 (statistically significant) in Lithuania, where most Slavic pattern should hold even when the analysis controls for various demographic factors such as education, urban versus rural residence, age and gender.
To follow the distinction made by others, we analyse two dimensions of authoritarianism: the desire for strong leadership and a preference for order in society. We measure the impact of the desire for strong leadership using an index of two questions (see Appendix). This index ranges from zero to two depending on how often a respondent answered in a 'leadership-supportive' fashion. As Figure 1 illustrates, our data do not support the hypothesis that the desire for strong leadership will have a clear-cut cross-society pattern. Russia and Ukraine have almost identical distributions. Lithuanians on average score slightly lower on the scale, but the differences in the means between Lithuania and either of the other two states fail to achieve statistical significance (as indicated by the t-test statistics). Notably, the proportion of the Lithuanian sample that most supports strong leadership is as high as in the Slavic societies. When we separate western Ukraine from the other parts of Ukraine, the mean score is 1.21, the same as Lithuania's, though again the differences in means are not statistically significant.
We measure the impact of the desire for order using an index of three questions each relating in a slightly different way to a personal desire for order and stability (see Appendix). Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of this index across the three states. Though the mean score for Lithuania in 1992 is slightly lower (1.69 versus 1.73 for Russia and 1.78 for Ukraine), the differences are not statistically significant. Moreover, if one collapses the four-point scale into two categories -low and high -one sees that the data are split very evenly in the Slavic societies and in Lithuania: each has roughly 60 per cent of the sample favouring order and 40 per cent eschewing it.
One pattern worth noting is that the desire for order increases in all three societies from 1991 to 1992. In 1991, the desire for order in Lithuania was significantly different from the patterns in Russia and Ukraine. In 1992, though, anxieties had risen in all three societies, most sharply among Lithuanian citizens. The increased Lithuanian desire for order undercut the distinctiveness of Lithuanian views found in 1991. The two-year period covered by our surveys was a time of growing social and political discord, when citizens faced rising economic and physical insecurity (including the deployment of military force in Lithuania and Russia). Evidently, these developments made order more attractive in all three societies.
In sum, we must reject the 'historically derived political culture' hypothesis: Russians, and those long under Russian hegemony, do not evidence a more authoritarian disposition when compared to the Lithuanians. Our findings support the few historical studies that downplay a Russian authoritarian tradition. 14 (F'note continued) residents immigrated in recent decades. In Lithuania, it quite clearly did matter whether one was Russian or Lithuanian. Elsewhere, it did not.
14 For example, Keenan, 'Muscovite Political Folkways'. Q) a.
IillI Those positing historical continuity face a challenge that they only rarely confront directly: deciding when history stopS.15 The Russian-history school bears the burden of demonstrating that sixteenth-century events, practices or outlooks continue to have any bearing given the impact of twentieth-century events, practices and outlooks. Even if one believes that value change comes slowly, it seems plausible to expect that, over the course of several generations, the impact of long-distant values on the formation of current values would increasingly weaken. While momentum may be a powerful force, decay is another well-established physical and social property. Long-distance electrical transmissions would decay without periodic 'boosters' that help maintain the is that 'What makes Communist societies unique is the aggressive effort on the part of all the regimes over several generations to make basically the same official political culture the only political culture' . 20 Most such observers depict the impact of indoctrination by the Soviet regime (and by Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe) as fundamentally negative and, in particular, as anti-democratic. Bialer points to 'a philosophy of dependency instead of self-reliance, of an all-embracing collectivism and conformity over individualism, of commitment to the equalization not only of opportunities but also of outcomes, of rigidity and extremism of beliefs, and of intolerance. ,21 He argues that, even though the workers suffered the most from a 'utopian idea run amok', they were the ones who internalized the values and habits expressed in communist ideology. 22 Similarly, Feher asserts that the acceptance of paternalism -wanting someone to look after you, which therefore is the opposite of liberty-seeking -is a key element of culture in Soviet-type societies.23 For these observers, the main hope for a democratic political culture is that the indoctrination did not 'take'.
Previous empirical work on this question is ambivalent. The interviews with Soviet emigres in the 1950s indicated that widespread support existed among these emigres for some aspects of the Soviet system that were central to the ideology. Among them was support for state control of large-scale industry. Moreover, the emigre interviews of the 1970s and 1980s reaffirmed several key findings of the earlier research. Yet recent surveys of Soviet citizens find unexpectedly high levels of support for values outside the Soviet ideology, including individual rights and democratic institutions. 24 20 See McGregor, 'Value Structures in a Developed Socialist System', p. 183. 21 Bialer, 'Is Socialism Dead?' p. 100. On pp. 101-2, Bialer argues that intolerance (and acceptance of authoritarianism) among Soviet citizens is evidenced by popular support for the death penalty. Yet according to the General Social Survey, 71.5 per cent of Americans in 1991 supported capital punishment in the case of murder. Given this level of public support for the death penalty in a long-established democracy, we find Bialer's indicator to be of questionable value.
22 An opposing hypothesis should be noted. White, 'The USSR', p.35, has argued that the Bolshevik regime adopted policies that reflected the traditional culture. According to him, any popular acceptance of Soviet-era practices occurred because those practices accorded with popular beliefs not because the beliefs underwent change. Similarly, Keenan argues in 'Muscovite Political Folkways' that the trends that produced the Soviet system by the end of the 1930s simultaneously led to a new synthesis of the traditional culture and hence to an essential continuity before and after 1917. Certainly, Bialer's description of the effects of communist ideology (quoted above) sounds suspiciously similar to the list of putative effects of Russian history. 23 If indoctrination during the Soviet period had the desired effect and was enduring, responses indicating support for specific communist values should be high, and in particularly should be higher in Russia and Ukraine than in Lithuania since the latter spent twenty fewer years under Soviet rule. Also, the indoctrination should have a particular cross-time pattern. A common expectation among scholars is that citizens form values as young adults that stay fairly stable the rest of their lives. Changes in a society's distribution of values thus result from demographic changes. The analyst predicts a generation's values based on the experiences of that generation when they were young adults, either personal factors such as the level of education achieved, or major events such as political terror, wars or economic depressions. 25 Allowing for the greater impact of indoctrination on the generation that came of age in the 1920s and 1930s (and who form the older portion of our respondents), the level of acceptance of Soviet values should be highest among that generation and lower but stable across later generations. 26 To measure acceptance of Soviet values, we employ two devices, one emphasizing the political dimension and the other the economic dimension. The first is a question repeated in all three years. We asked respondents to agree or disagree (or do either strongly) with the statement that 'These days, Stalin is not given adequate credit for his accomplishments'. The way one interprets Soviet life under Stalin has long been a potent symbol of one's attitude towards many aspects of the Soviet system. 27 The famous 1988 letter from Leningrad chemistry lecturer Nina Andreeva attacking perestroika brought the issue into the open. Some see the Stalin era as a time when an industrial and military superpower was built with the enthusiastic dedication of the people. Others, of course, see the period as one of mass terror and repression. 14 (1982) , 403-44. We do not seek to distinguish between these effects rigorously but note that the two seem likely to work together. The older generation are currently the most conservative in support of the Soviet period and Soviet institutions, but a natural tendency to value the past more highly than younger age cohorts is reinforced by the oldest generation's experiences during the early years of Soviet power. We can point, moreover, to partial evidence that political generations are salient in these societies, since the generational pattern is somewhat different in Lithuania from that which it is in Russia and Ukraine. proportion of each country's sample that agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. First, note that the proportion of supporters of Stalin never exceeds a third of the population in any of the societies. Of course, even those levels are higher than one would find in non-Soviet societies. Cross-nationally, the indoctrination argument suggests that Russian and Ukrainian respondents should view Stalin positively to roughly the same degree and both should do so more positively than citizens of Lithuania. This pattern held in 1990 (20% and 21 % for Russia and Ukraine vs. 10% in Lithuania) and, to a lesser degree, in 1991 (25% and 22% for Russia and Ukraine vs. 15% in Lithuania). In 1992, however, the positive orientation toward Stalin jumps upward in both Russia and Lithuania, but not in Ukraine. The indoctrination hypothesis cannot account for respondents in Lithuania giving Stalin greater credit than those in Ukraine.
To measure acceptance of the regime's desired orientation toward economic policies, we employ an index of six variables (see Appendix). Figure 4 shows the distribution of this index in each country. Lithuania does have the lowest average score on this index. The difference is slight, however, and only the difference in means between Ukraine and Lithuania is statistically significant, as indicated by the t-tests. Why Ukraine should have an average score as much higher than Russia's as the Lithuanian score is lower than Russia's cannot be explained by the potential for indoctrination alone.
What about the generational expectations of the regime indoctrination hypothesis? After the initial impact of the Stalinist transformation of these societies, the level and impact of regime efforts to indoctrinate the populace ought to have been relatively stable until the Gorbachev period. Yet, as Figures  5 and 6 demonstrate, the regime's indoctrination efforts become rather steadily less effective from the older generations to the younger. There is a conspicuous gap between the mean score for those citizens of Russia over 67 years old and those who are younger. The support falls rather continuously, moreover. Lithuania, oddly enough, most closely matches the expectations of the indoctrination thesis. The oldest respondents in our sample, those who achieved adulthood during the pre-Soviet period, are less supportive of Stalin than the next four decade cohorts. The harsh indoctrination efforts applied to Lithuanian society following its incorporation into the Soviet Union might have had an effect. Only the youngest respondents in Lithuania show less support of Stalin than the oldest group. In Figure 6 , the upward trend in average level of support for regime economic values as one moves from the younger to the older respondents is pronounced in all three countries. Although regime norms strongly affected the oldest generations, the leadership's efforts to indoctrinate the populace grew increasingly less effective the more the transforming events of the 1930s and 1940s receded.
In sum, our data do not support the argument that Soviet indoctrination efforts had an overarching, society-wide impact. Those reaching conclusions about Soviet political values based on regime indoctrination do not argue that only one or two generations will be affected. While Communist party monopoly of the instruments of social control remained strong into the late collectivization of agriculture, the resulting migration to the cities, as well as increased literacy and access to higher education all changed Soviet societies, making them more 'modern' and therefore more open to democratic and market reforms. 3D Others have challenged that conclusion. White stressed the continued rural and pre-modern character of Soviet society. He predicted that future years would see 'little more than marginal changes in the distinctive blend of tradition and modernity, "autocracy" and "industrialism", by which that political culture may presently be characterized' . that societal transformations had influenced popular values by revealing generational cleavages on several important dimensions. Because the pattern is not entirely clear, however, it deserves further attention. 33 To investigate the degree to which the authoritarian and ideological values varied according to demographic characteristics, we regressed our previously introduced measures (desire for strong leadership, desire for order, assessment of Stalin and level of acceptance of economic indoctrination) on age, highest level of education obtained, whether the respondent lived in an urban or rural setting and, in Lithuania, whether the respondent was Russian. Tables 1-4 present the results. The low? statistics for all the models reveal that demographics alone, not surprisingly, do not suffice to account for the patterns of values in these societies. However, in several cases the explanatory power of key variables deserves note. For example, in Table 1 , the desire for strong leadership varies notably between urban and rural respondents in both Russia and Ukraine (standardized coefficients of 0.18 and 0.24, respectively). In contrast to what one might have expected, urban respondents value strong leadership more highly (at least when one holds education level and year of birth constant, as this equation does). Even more unexpected is the finding that the more highly educated are more supportive of strong leadership (positive and significant coefficients in all three societies). Separating out Russians in Lithuania does not have a strong influence. These results make clear that, as noted in footnote 9 on p. 189, the links between the desire for strong leadership and authoritarianism must be tested not assumed.
In all three societies, the most powerful explanation for variation in the desire for order is age (see Table 2 ). The older respondents most strongly prefer order in all three societies. No other explanatory factor has a noteworthy impact. Similarly, age strongly influences the respondent's view of Stalin (see Table 3 ), with the impact particularly strong in Russia and Ukraine (standardized coefficients of -0.22 and -0.18, respectively). This illustrates the fact that the pattern found in Figure 5 remains strong when controlling for other possible influences. In Russia, the more educated are also less likely to view Stalin favorably. Finally, the more educated, younger and urban citizens in all three countries are less supportive of the old regime's economic doctrines (Table 4) . Not surprisingly, Russians in Lithuania are significantly more likely to accept those doctrines than ethnic Lithuanians, with that variable remaining strong even when controlling for the other demographic factors.
This evidence of intra-societal complexity in the distribution of key values serves as a reminder that inter-societal comparisons that characterize a society by a single number are at best very crude simplifications. Neither 'Russian history' nor 'Soviet indoctrination' can account for the diversity of political outlooks. These particular results also support the arguments that the tumultuous recent history of these societies has left its mark on them. In each one, there is an educated urban stratum with distinctive outlooks, as well as a generation gap on key values. With this in mind, we tum to the question of democratic prospects in the Soviet successor states. We cannot provide a definitive evaluation of these prospects, of course. Not only is a full examination of the link between current political values and democratization outside the scope of this article, but the prospects depend on more than public values. Nevertheless, the argument about mass publics and democratization in the former Soviet Union has tended to remain at the societal level of analysis. The foregoing analyses suggest that much is to be gained by delving deeper into the implications of the intrasocietal patterns for democracy.
VALUES AND MASS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN THREE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS
From the ancient Greeks onward, theorists have argued that democratic institutions must quickly fail without supportive public behaviour. Certain public values must presumably exist by the time a country establishes democratic institutions; there will be insufficient time for the values to emerge afterwards. In the absence of such values, a burst of pro-democratic enthusiasm or a stratum of elites committed to democracy are unlikely to translate into stable democratic institutions. This argument has enjoyed widespread acceptance in Western scholarship at least since the publication of Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture. 34 The argument has been used frequently to make pessimistic assessments of the prospects for democracy in the former Soviet Union. The argument, then, is that the widespread distribution within a society of certain orientations may come close to being necessary for that society to create a reasonably long-lasting democracy. Even observers who doubt that particular values are prerequisites agree that they help to solidify democratic institutions. 'It is obvious ... that the emergence and persistence of a democratic government among a group of people depends in some way on their beliefs. >35 Virtually none of those focusing on mass values, however, consider them to be sufficient. All the former Soviet societies are currently facing significant political (and economic and social) turmoil. Consequently, much political behaviour in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania strikes observers as non-democratic. The distribution of values, however, is worthy of study nevertheless. For one thing, the debate among social scientists hypothesizes a link between values and democratization, and that link deserves investigation in the former Soviet Union. For another, blaming the public for such things as low levels of support for nominally democratic institutions, low levels of membership in non-communist political parties or low electoral turnout begs the question of whether the institutions, party leaderships or candidates for office are worthy of public support. If we seek to understand what exactly is promoting and what is hindering democratization, we need to separate the impact of mass values from such other plausible explanations for current turmoil as poorly designed institutions and non-democratic, corrupt elites.
Theorists have put forth various specific values or beliefs as vital to democracy. One is for citizens to give general (or 'diffuse') support to the institutions of their democracy, as well as to the superiority of democratic rule. 36 A second is when citizens, on the whole, trust other members of the society. Many argue that without such interpersonal trust political partisans will be unlikely to follow the rules of the game: to see opponents as loyal opponents who will not kill or imprison them if they lose. 37 Also, people need to have interpersonal trust for them to be willing to form and participate in 'secondary associations', which make democracies work. 38 A third type of outlook seen as supportive of democracy is when citizens place a high value on individual rights. 39 For these and other values posited as 'supportive of democracy', the argument is not that an individual holding those values would struggle against authoritarian rule, but that when such values are widely distributed within a society democratization is more likely to succeed.
Those analysing the prospects for democratization in the Soviet successor states tend to be extremely pessimistic.
To put it bluntly: the Leninist legacy, understood as the impact of Party organization, practice, and ethos, and the initial charismatic opposition to it, favor an authoritarian, not a liberal democratic capitalist, way of life; the obstacles to which are not simply how to privatize and marketize the economy, or organize an electoral campaign, but rather how to institutionalize public virtues. 4o
A few observers argue that requisite orientations took root during the Soviet period and provide an at least somewhat hospitable soil for democracy.41 As with the debates about the sources of values, debates about the implications of current values too often rest on anecdotal evidence. With mass surveys, a much stronger source of evidence is available. We now examine several indicators of democratic orientations and their relationship to history, indoctrination and demographic features of Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. We examine five indicators of values supportive of democracy, the first of which is the level of interpersonal trust. Figure 7 indicates the proportions of each sample that felt they could trust people. Given that Lithuania is generally accorded the best democratic prospects (due to its stronger ties to Western traditions and culture), it is surprising that Lithuanians are less trusting than Russians. For all three societies, the level of trust is lower than in many of the countries included in the 1980 World Values Survey. 42 (The Scandinavian countries top the charts with levels of trust over 50 per cent.) Yet despite the generally low level of trust in the former Soviet societies, the levels in Russia and Lithuania exceed those in France and Italy. (Russia also exceeds Belgium and Germany.)
Our survey also asked respondents to fully agree, agree, disagree or fully disagree with the statement that party competition strengthens the political system. Figure 8 illustrates the percentage of respondents in each of the three societies that agreed or agreed fully with the statement in 1990, 1991 and 1992. On this dimension, again, Lithuanians seem to have values less supportive of democracy. It is noteworthy that (for all three societies) the level of support for party competition/ails from 1990 to 1992 (the mean scores rose). The sense of excitement and empowerment that many Soviet citizens felt in the course of All-Union and republic elections during 1989 and 1990 was wearing off.
We asked respondents in 1992 to agree or disagree with the statement 'Anyone has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any governmental initiative'. The use of the language was deliberately rather extreme so that those agreeing would be those who have a fairly well-developed sense of individual liberty vis-a-vis the state. 43 The respondent is asked to select the two most important goals for his or her country from a list of four. Two of the goals focus on economics and crime (and are therefore 'materialist'), and two focus on freedom of speech and popular political influence (postmaterialist). The latter two, 'postmaterialist', goals measure support for key aspects of democratic governance. So, even though Inglehart's battery was not devised as a measure of democracy-supporting values, the ranking of the two postmaterialist goals provides such a measure. The index is constructed simply by counting whether the respondent selected zero, one or both of the postmaterialist goals. Figure 10 indicates that Russia and Ukraine have almost identical distributions, and both differ from Lithuania. In Lithuania, the proportion of full postmaterialists, as well as the proportion of mixed materialistJpostmaterialists, is larger than in Russia and Ukraine. This gap suggests that Lithuanians' focus on economic problems and internal security is less likely to soften their commitment to libertarian rights.
The final measure of democratic values is an index of support for individual rights. The index measures how many of three possible rights the respondent felt should 'always be protected' rather than 'protected only in some circumstances'. Figure 11 shows that Lithuanian scores on this index are significantly higher than in Ukraine, in which the scores are significantly higher than in Russia. Even in Russia, however, three out of ten respondents call for the continuous protection of all three rights, while another third calls for protection of two of the three. Rights consciousness is well established in all three former Soviet societies. As noted by Gibson, Duch and Tedin, demands for liberal rights seem to co-exist with a desire for order. 44 To understand the distributions within these societies of pro-democratic values better, we combine three of the five measures just presented into a single index of values supportive of democracy (see Appendix). Although interpersonal trust and selection of 'postmaterial' goals for the country have both been prominent indicators of democratic values in other studies, they showed little covariance with the other indicators. 45 We therefore excluded them from the index. The index ranges from 0 (least supportive of democracy) to 5 (most supporti ve). Figure 12 shows the distribution of this index in each society. The distributions of values in Russia and Ukraine are almost identical. In Lithuania, the curve is quite similar, though shifted to the right. The t-tests support the visual evidence that democratic values are more prevalent in Lithuania. In all three former Soviet republics, the presence of democratic values among much of the populace is high. In each, a minority scores in the lower categories of the index.
To Table 5 presents the results of a multivariate regression. In Russia, level of education, desire for order and acceptance of economic indoctrination are statistically significant and account for more than Table 4 demonstrated, the young are much more likely to reject tenets of Soviet economics, an orientation that strongly correlates with democratic values. In Ukraine, as in Russia, the index of economic indoctrination has the strongest impact on the variation in democratic values. Ukraine, however, shows different demographic and attitudinal cleavages. Those with a high desire for strong leadership, those who do not believe that Stalin's accomplishments are undervalued and urban residents are more supportive of democracy, even controlling for economic orientation. Level of education does not have a strong independent impact, as it does in Russia.
In Lithuania, as elsewhere, the index of economic indoctrination is a key explanatory variable, but two others stand out as well: whether the respondent is ethnically Russian (if so, he or she is less likely to have supportive values) and the respondent's desire for order (a high desire for order reduces the likelihood that he or she has supportive values). The desire for order has a strong negative impact even after controlling for the difference between Russians and Lithuanians. Recall that a desire for order is postulated to be salient in Russia, not in Lithuania. Even when we control for other factors, the age of the respondent exerts a significant influence on the distribution of democratic values. Note, though, that in Lithuania the young are less likely to hold values supportive of democracy when we control for the greater propensity of the young to reject Soviet economic norms. This seems likely to reflect the higher proportion of the Lithuanian sample who grew up prior to the imposition of Soviet power.
Overall, the desire for strong leadership is positively associated with support for democratic values. This would be unexpected to those who presume that a desire for strong leadership forms part of an 'authoritarian', or anti-democratic political culture. It raises fascinating questions about the understandings of "democracy' held by citizens of the post-Soviet states, questions that are outside the scope of this article. We will note, though, that the questions referred to in the measure of desire for strong leadership ask respondents to react to the desirability of a few trusted, competent, or strong leaders making the decisions.
Thus, those desiring strong leadership were not expressing a wish for arbitrary or harmful leadership. Rather, they were expressing a desire for 'good government' by means of finding the proper leaders and allowing them to govern. Even so, many would say that, unless the populace values widespread participation in decision making, authoritarian rule is easier to live with. Our data suggests that an alternative conception of democracy holds sway among many in the former Soviet Union. Democratic theorists from Schumpeter and Schattschneider through Przeworski have downplayed the importance of widespread mass participation as a requisite element of democracy, stressing elite competition instead. 46 In this view, democracy is served by the citizens being able to choose between competing parties, each able to form a government that concentrates a large amount of power in the hands of a few politicians (the British Prime Minister and cabinet, for example, face comparatively few constraints on their actions if a legislative majority can be maintained). 'Good government' and public control over the government derive not from the public being involved in decision making but by the periodic ability to vote out of office a sitting government that has not produced the desired results. If the urban, better-educated respondents view democracy in this fashion, that would explain the correlation between the measure of desire for strong leadership and democratic values.
To further clarify how demographic groupings influence the strength of democratic values, we contrast those respondents who were most supportive of democracy on our index (i.e., those who scored four or five out of five possible) with the remaining respondents along several pertinent dimensions. As Table  6 reveals, the group with values most supportive of democracy includes more urban residents and more males and is younger, better educated, less religious, wealthier and more politically active than respondents in the other group. Each characteristic remains true for all three societies under examination.
These differences have noteworthy political consequences. In Figure 13 , we portray the average score on the index of democratic values in each of three socio-economic strata: rural respondents, urban respondents whose highest level of education is secondary school or lower, and urban respondents who obtained at least some higher education. This breakdown is roughly equivalent to rural, blue-collar and white-collar segments of society. The gap between Lithuania and the two Slavic societies is largest among the rural respondents, weaker but still statistically significant for the blue-collar respondents and has completely disappeared, in the sense of statistical significance, among the white-collar respondents. In pondering the chances for Russian versus Lithuanian democratization, one would have to take into account the finding that democratic values are almost equally high in both societies' urban professionals. Members of the urban professional stratum are more likely to be both active and influential in any society. They were clearly the predominant movers in the transformation of the USSR in the Gorbachev era. Their values might well be more important in assessing the prospects for democratization than the mean for the society as a whole. Table 6 reinforces the likelihood that those with values supportive of democracy are more likely to be influential by revealing that they tend to be younger, to have higher incomes and to report themselves as having been more participatory. The complex distribution of Soviet values helps explain the rapidity of political change after 1985. Despite the 'stagnation' of much official policy under Brezhnev, the demographic, educational and economic trends of preceding decades had produced a highly complex society, many of whose members held values conducive to fundamental changes. As society became increasingly complex and 'modern', so did the membership of the Communist party and the ranks of party and state bureaucrats, both in Moscow and throughout the regions. Gorbachev's calls for change were heard and acted upon in different, hard-to-predict ways by various groups in society and within the elite. Although scholars writing prior to 1985 were right to emphasize the vested interests that many elites had in preserving the existing Soviet system, this represented only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin -multiple constituencies for change -was much more difficult to see because of restrictions on access.
In addition, our data challenge those who rule out successful democratic consolidation because the Russian or Ukrainian or Lithuanian people lack a political culture that is ready for it. Our findings therefore support recent work by Hahn and Gibson, Ouch and Tedin.47 Of course, democratic consolidation in postcommunist societies will depend on elite values and strategies as well as on mass values. 48 Without predicting successful democratization on the basis of these findings, we do argue that the distribution of political values is unlikely to be the primary roadblock.
Because of Lithuania's Central European heritage and because it entered the Soviet Union later than the other two societies, some have presumed that Lithuanians will be less authoritarian, less indoctrinated by communist ideology and, therefore, more democratic. Yet in 1992, Lithuanians and Russians do not significantly differ in their desire for strong leadership and for order. Also, the Lithuanians do not have a sharply more 'democratic' intelligentsia than do Russia and Ukraine. If Lithuania's prospects for democratization are in fact stronger, the strength may have less to do with overall societal acceptance of democratic values and more to do with the common acceptance of democratic values across its social classes. Lithuanian farmers endorse democratic values almost as frequently as their urban counterparts. This is not true in Russia and Ukraine.
Further, the evidence that 'modernization' during this century has shaped political values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania could mean that post-Soviet publics will maintain for some time their current levels of receptivity to democracy. Increased or decreased support will emerge slowly through generational replacement. A counter hypothesis is worth noting, however. Alexander Tsipko has argued that Gorbachev's reforms from 1987 on constituted a 'moral revolution' that changed Soviet society fundamentally by calling into question long-accepted Stalinist institutions and orientations. 49 This raises the possibility that the more widespread acceptance of pro-democratic values among urban intellectuals and white-collar workers reflects the differential impact of this 'moral revolution' on different parts of society, not differences in life-long values. Without evidence that the better educated and younger held the same values prior to perestroika, one cannot rule out the possibility that they show higher levels of pro-democratic values because they have reacted more strongly to the dominant intellectual current of their time.
Even if modernization processes are central, breaking down the members of these societies into standard demographic groupings must be only a first step. Our results do not always find the expected value distinctions across groupings. Urban respondents, for instance, tend to value strong leadership more and to have greater support for Stalin's contributions while simultaneously showing more widespread democratic values. Attitudinal measures must also guide the search for which groups within a society will form constituencies for democracy. One can determine the attitudinal soil of democracy in these societies only by examining directly the patterns of political values.
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES EMPLOYED

Index of Desire for Strong Leadership
Respondents could fully agree (I), agree (2), disagree (4) or disagree fully (5), or not be able to say exactly (3), with the following statements:
(1) Popular participation is not necessary if decision making is left in the hands of a few trusted, competent leaders. (2) It will always be necessary to have a few strong people actually making decisions.
The index assigns a score of I to those who either agreed or fully agreed with one of these statements, 2 to those who either agreed or fully agreed with both and 0 to the others.
Index of Desire for Order
(1) It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they become disruptive. (2) Political reform in this country is moving too rapidly. (3) It is very important to stop crime even at the risk of violating the rights of the accused.
The index assigns a score of I to those who either agreed or fully agreed with one of these statements; 2 to those who either agreed or fully agreed with both; 3 to those who either agreed or fully agreed with all three; and 0 to the others.
View of Stalin
Respondents could disagree fully (I), disagree (2), agree (4) or fully agree (5), or not be able to say exactly (3), with the following statement:
These days, Stalin is not given adequate credit for his positive role in our history.
